Divorce (Equitable Distribution)
Mahoney-Buntzman v. Buntzman, Court of Appeals, Decided May 7, 2009
Johnson v. Chapin, Court of Appeals, Decided May 7, 2009
The wife was not entitled to a credit for one-half of marital funds used during the marriage to pay the husband's maintenance and child support obligations to his former wife.

Divorce (Equitable Distribution of Enhanced Earning Capacity)
Guha v. Guha, Appellate Division, Second Department, Decided April 7, 2009
The Supreme Court did not err in awarding the husband only 5% of the enhanced earning capacity resulting from the wife's medical license.  Where only modest contributions are made by the nontitled spouse toward the other spouse's attainment of a degree or professional license, and the attainment is more directly the result of the titled spouse's own ability, tenacity, perseverance and hard work, it is appropriate for courts to limit the distributed amount of that enhanced earning capacity. 

Divorce (Pendente Lite Support, Interim Attorneys Fees)
Mueller v. Mueller, Appellate Division, Second Department, Decided April 7, 2009
Temporary maintenance award was sufficient to meet the wife's reasonable needs during the pendency of the divorce action, given that the husband was also directed to pay the carrying charges on the marital residence, including mortgage payments, taxes, utilities, pool maintenance, and other household expenses, as well as various types of insurance coverage for the wife and the parties' children, and to pay reasonable expenses associated with the parties' vehicles.  The wife was not entitled to temporary child support because both parties continued to reside with the children in the marital residence, and there was no evidence that the children were not being properly cared for by the husband.  Given the disparity in the parties' financial circumstances, however, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the wife's motion which was for an award of interim counsel fees in the sum of $ 25,000. The court gave no explanation for its decision to award the sum of only $ 10,000, and the wife's request for the sum of $ 25,000 was reasonable under the circumstances.

Modification of Visitation
Riedel v. Riedel, Appellate Division, Second Department, Decided April 28, 2009
The Supreme Court did not err in dismissing, without a hearing, the mother's petition to modify the visitation provisions of the parties' judgment of divorce.  Modification of an existing custody or visitation arrangement is permissible only upon a showing that there has been a change in circumstances such that a modification is necessary to ensure the continued best interests and welfare of the child.  A person seeking a change in visitation is not automatically entitled to a hearing, but must make an evidentiary showing sufficient to warrant a hearing.

Relocation
Said v. Said, Appellate Division, Second Department, Decided April 21, 2009
The Court reversed an order of the Family Court which denied the mother's request to relocate with the children to Pennsylvania and transferred custody of the children to the father.  Although each custodial parent's request for relocation must be decided on its own merits, the factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the move, the quality of the relationships between the children and each parent, the impact of the move on the quantity and quality of the children's future contact with the noncustodial parent, the degree to which the lives of the custodial parent and the children may be enhanced economically, emotionally, and educationally by the move, and the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the noncustodial parent and the children through suitable visitation arrangements.  The mother established that  [**5] the children's best interests would be served by permitting the relocation, which will, among other things, still permit the children to have a meaningful relationship with the father.

Modification of Child Support
Ripa v. Ripa, Appellate Division, Second Department, Decided April 14, 2009
The Family Court, Suffolk County, properly denied the father's petition for downward modification of his child support obligation set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement which was incorporated but not merged in the parties' divorce judgment.  The child support provisions contained in a settlement agreement should not be disturbed unless there is a substantial, unanticipated, and unreasonable change in circumstances since the entry of the divorce judgment.  In determining whether such a change of circumstances has been shown, a court need not rely upon the party's account of his or her finances, but may also impute income based upon the party's past income or demonstrated earning potential.  The Support Magistrate found, in effect, that the father's tax returns and other financial documentation provided an incomplete account of his finances. In addition, at the hearing there was a failure of proof as to exact circumstances under which the father lost his former employment, whether it was due to his fault, and whether he used his best efforts to obtain new employment commensurate with his qualifications and experience.

Grounds for Divorce (Abandonment)
Gulati v. Gulati, Appellate Division, Second Department, Decided March 17, 2009
The plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on her cause of action for divorce on abandonment grounds.  Since abandonment cannot be established merely by evidence of a separation, a plaintiff seeking a divorce on this ground has an obligation to prove, as an element of his or her prima facie case, that the defendant unjustifiably left and remained away from the marital residence for a period of more than one year.  The defendant raised issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff consented to his initial departure from the marital residence and to his continued absence from the home, and whether his actions were justified.

Divorce (Marital Property vs. Separate Property)
Steinberg v. Steinberg, Appellate Division, Second Department, Decided Feb. 24, 2009
Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be marital property and the party seeking to overcome such presumption has the burden of proving that the property in dispute is separate property. The assets in question were acquired during the marriage, and the defendant's testimony that the source of the assets could be traced to premarital property, unsupported by documentary evidence, was insufficient to overcome the marital presumption

Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages
Martinez v. County of Monroe, Appellate Division, Fourth Dept., Decided Feb. 1, 2008
Plaintiff married her same-sex partner in Canada, and sought to have her marriage recognized by her employer, Monroe Community College, for the purpose of obtaining health care benefits for her spouse. The employer refused. The Supreme Court, Monroe County, granted judgment to the employer. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the plaintiff’s same-sex marriage solemnized in Canada was entitled to recognition in New York, as it does not fall within either of the two exceptions to the marriage recognition rule. The recognition of the marriage is not prohibited by "positive law," as the New York Legislature has not enacted legislation to prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriages validly entered into outside of New York. In addition, the "natural law" exception is not applicable. The Court found that such exception has generally be limited to marriages involving polygamy or incest or marriages "‘offensive to the public sense of morality to a degree regarded generally with abhorrence’ and that cannot be said here." Motion for leave to appeal dismissed, Court of Appeals, May 6, 2008.

Pre-Nuptial and Post-Nuptial Agreements
Legislation Tolls Statute of Limitations
Effective July, 2007, Domestic Relations Law §250 provides that the statute of limitations to set aside a pre-nuptial or post-nuptial agreement is three years, and that the clock does not begin to run until the service of process in a matrimonial action or the death of one of the parties. Previously, such agreements were covered under the six year statute of limitations set forth in the CPLR, and there was disagreement between the First and Second Judicial Departments as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled during the marriage. Those in the Second Department were forced to litigate the validity of their agreements early on, despite the existence of a happy and intact marriage, or they would later be barred from doing so. The new law does not apply, however, to separation agreements or agreements entered into during or in settlement of a matrimonial action, which remain bound by the six year limit.